Extending ECC-based RFID authentication protocols to privacy-preserving multi-party grouping proofs by Batina, L. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/91802
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Extending ECC-Based RFID Authentication Protocols to
Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Grouping Proofs
Lejla Batina · Yong Ki Lee · Stefaan Seys ·
Dave Singele´e · Ingrid Verbauwhede
Received: October 25, 2010 / Accepted: date
Abstract Since the introduction of the concept of grouping proofs by Juels, which
permit RFID tags to generate evidence that they have been scanned simultaneously,
various new schemes have been proposed. Their common property is the use of
symmetric-key primitives. However, it has been shown that such schemes often entail
scalability, security and/or privacy problems. In this article, we extend the notion of
public-key RFID authentication protocols, and propose a privacy-preserving multi-
party grouping-proof protocol which relies exclusively on the use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC). It allows to generate a proof which is verifiable by a trusted ver-
ifier in an offline setting, even when readers or tags are potentially untrusted, and it
is privacy-preserving in the setting of a narrow-strong attacker. We also demonstrate
that our RFID grouping-proof protocol can easily be extended to use cases with more
than two tags, without any additional cost for an RFID tag. To illustrate the imple-
mentation feasibility of our proposed solutions, we present a novel ECC hardware
architecture designed for RFID.
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1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification systems are rapidly expanding their applications to
many areas: inventory systems, supply chains, access control, vehicle tracking, toll
payments, e-ticketing, pharmaceutics, etc. The advantage of RFID over bar-code
technology is that it does not require direct line-of-sight reading and that tags can
be interrogated at greater distances. The technology also enables the automation of
some control processes, which results in a significant gain in terms of time and cost.
However, due to wide spread of tags and its cheap implementations, these appli-
cations risk the security and privacy of a tag carrier. The need for privacy-preserving
RFID protocols is evident even in these extremely resourceless environments. In par-
ticular, RFID tags have severe limitations with respect to area, power and energy.
Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that these devices are able to perform basic
cryptographic operations. Even more, nowadays even public-key protocols found
their way in RFID applications [10,17,15].
In most RFID systems, there is a clear demand for identification of the tag and/or
the reader. Recently, Juels [11] extended this notion and envisioned the concept of
grouping proofs (also denoted by yoking proofs), which allows two or more tags to
provide evidence that they were scanned simultaneously by a reader within its broad-
cast range. There are various practical scenarios where there is an explicit need for
such protocols [6,11,24]. For example, there could be a legal requirement that certain
medication should be distributed together with a brochure describing its side-effects.
A technical solution to this problem is to attach RFID tags to both the medication and
the brochures, and create grouping proofs when they are scanned simultaneously.
The pharmacist then stores these grouping proofs as evidence, to transmit them to
the government for verification. Another practical scenario is aircraft security, when
a certain piece of a plane can only leave a factory accompanied by a security cap. By
using grouping proofs, one can also couple a physical person via his passport to his
boarding pass, or – in the military context – only enabling weaponry or equipment
when an appropriate group of entities is present. Other use cases include governmen-
tal administration, to check that a specific form is enclosed with its corresponding
stamp, or scenarios when one wants to generate evidence that a group of people were
present at a particular location.
Various grouping proofs have been proposed in the literature. Unlike these schemes,
our solutions are based on public-key cryptography and in particular on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) [14,20]. This feature makes the protocols lightweight enough
to be considered suitable even for passive tags, as will be shown later in the article.
An abridged, short version of this paper has been published in [2]. Our contribu-
tions can be summarized as follows:
– We extend the ID-transfer protocol of Lee et al. [15] to a secure ECC-based
privacy-preserving two-party grouping-proof protocol.
– We prove the concept is easily extendable to the case with more than two tags,
without any additional cost for the tags.
– We show how the complexity can be reduced in scenarios where the colluding
tags attack is not relevant.
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– We describe a novel architecture that is optimized on performance, showing that
our solutions are suitable for RFID technology.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we list previous
related work in the area of grouping proofs and show that all these schemes are based
on symmetric-key primitives. In contrast, our solution relies exclusively on the use
of ECC and extends the notion of public-key-based RFID authentication protocols,
which are briefly discussed in Sect. 3. Next, in Sect. 4 we describe our assump-
tions and adversarial model. Our ECC-based multi-party grouping-proof protocols
are given in Sect. 5 and Sect. 6. A novel architecture for an ECC processor suitable
for RFID is outlined in Sect. 7. We also give performance figures for the new proto-
cols proving that our solutions are feasible for passive RFID tags. We conclude our
work in Sect. 8.
2 Related work
The idea of grouping proofs originates from Juels [11]. The motivation comes from
any application that requires the combined presence of two (or more entities). His
proposal for this type of identification protocol, so-called yoking proof, relies on in-
terleaving MACs of two tags using a reading device as a communication medium. The
grouping proof generated in Juels’ yoking-proof protocol, is verifiable by a trusted
party, even when readers are potentially untrusted.
Saito and Sakurai [26] were the first to point out weaknesses in the work of Juels.
They showed that the minimalist version of Juels is subject to replay attacks and
they proposed a new solution using time stamps. They also generalized the concept
for a group of tags and introduced the corresponding grouping proofs. However, Pi-
ramuthu [25] demonstrated that this new proof is also vulnerable to replay attacks
and he proposed a modification. His ideas include adding another random variable
sent from the verifier to the tags (through the reader) and the assumption that no
proof should be generated without including the secret values (obtained by a one-
way function) from all the tags. Bolotnyy and Robins [3] proposed a new solution for
the grouping proofs and addressed the requirements on privacy. The new protocol is
called anonymous yoking and each tag is supposed to compute a keyed hash function
and a MAC. The main drawback of the scheme is the computational complexity on
the side of the verifier being O(n2). Peris-Lopez et al. [23] proposed an improvement,
so-called clumping proofs, that are privacy-preserving and the verification takes O(n)
steps. Burmester et al. present a security model based on the Universal Composability
framework for this so-called group-scanning problem [6]. The requirements consid-
ered include privacy and forward security. As a result three grouping proofs are pro-
posed that require only pseudo-random functions. Starting from the first one without
anonymity each protocol adds a new property to the previous one, i.e., anonymity
and forward secrecy. Lien et al. [19] proposed an order-independent protocol, which
should improve the efficiency and reduce the failure rates. The reason for improved
efficiency is the fact that there is no requirement on predefined reading order. Finally,
Leng et al. [18] proposed a variant of the grouping protocol that is actively choosing
4 Lejla Batina et al.
the tag to be verified. Their solution is rather similar to the concept of an RFID search
protocol.
The common property for all the schemes proposed so far is the use of symmetric-
key primitives: e.g., hash functions, MACs, pseudo-random functions etc. Such schemes
are however often not scalable, and entail several security (e.g., cloning attacks)
and/or privacy problems (e.g., it is proven that one needs public-key cryptography
to achieve a certain level of privacy protection [30]). In contrast to this, we propose
to rely exclusively on the use of public-key cryptography. More in particular, we show
how to extend the ECC-based ID-transfer protocol proposed by Lee et al. [15] to a
privacy-preserving multi-party grouping-proof protocol.
3 Public-key-based RFID authentication protocols
Most attempts to design RFID authentication protocols rely on the use of symmetric-
key cryptography. Of the many notable designs, we mention here the HB+ protocol
of Juels and Weis [12], which was one of the first solutions proposed in the litera-
ture. The main reason why most RFID authentication protocols use symmetric-key
primitives, lies in the common perception of public-key cryptography being too slow,
power-hungry and too complicated for such low-cost environments.
However, recent works proved this concept to be wrong, as for example the small-
est published ECC implementations [17,10] consume less area than the candidate
cryptographic hash algorithms proposed in the SHA-3 competition [29]). This has
led to the introduction of public-key based RFID authentication protocols. This ap-
proach solves the scalability issues that often burden symmetric-key solutions, pre-
vents cloning attacks and offers advanced privacy protection.
Lee et al. [16] proposed the EC-RAC (Elliptic Curve Based Randomized Access
Control) protocol, based on the conventional public-key based authentication proto-
col of Schnorr [27]. However, in [5,8], it is shown that EC-RAC is vulnerable to track-
ing attacks and replay attacks, and in addition [5], the randomized Schnorr protocol
has been proposed. Later, the EC-RAC protocol has been gradually revised to counter
the the known attacks. This resulted in the ID-transfer protocol [15], which is resis-
tant against active impersonation attacks, and is narrow-strong privacy-preserving.
This protocol will be the basic building block in the construction of our grouping
proofs.
3.1 Notation
Let us first introduce the notation used in this work. We denote P as the base point on
a Elliptic Curve, and y and Y (= yP) are the trusted verifier’s private-key and public-
key pair, where yP denotes the point derived by the point multiplication operation on
the Elliptic Curve group. We use the notation x(T ) to denote the x-coordinate of the
point T on the elliptic curve, and r˙s to denote the non-linear mapping x(rsP), with P
the base point of the elliptic curve. The values st and St(= stP) are tag t’s private-key
and public-key. One should note, although the name suggests that it can be publicly
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known, that a tag should not reveal its public-key during the execution of the protocol,
as this would cause tracking attacks.
3.2 ID-transfer protocol
The ID-transfer protocol [15] is shown in Fig. 1. A tag first generates a random num-
ber rt , and computes and transmits the corresponding message T1 to the reader. After
receiving a challenge rs from the reader, a tag first checks that it is not equal to zero
or the order of the point P and then computes the response T2 using its private-key
s1, the random number rt , and the non-linear mapping r˙s of the challenge rs. The EC
point multiplication in this operation acts as a one-way function. The response T2 is
sent to the reader. Then, the reader derives the tag’s public-key S1(= s1P) and checks
if it is registered in the database. Note that only the reader is capable of performing
this verification, as this operation requires knowledge of the private-key y.
Fig. 1 ID-transfer protocol of Lee et al. [15].
y,S1
Reader
s1,Y
Tag
rt ∈R Z
T1 = rt P
rs ∈R Z
rs
r˙s = x(rsP)
T2 = (rt + r˙ss1)Y
Check s1P = (y−1T2−T1)r˙−1s
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4 Assumptions and adversarial model
The aim of constructing a grouping proof is to enable a set of RFID tags to generate a
proof that they have been scanned simultaneously by a reading device. In this setting,
there are three distinct parties involved: the set of tags, the reader, and a trusted ver-
ifier. The former two will engage in a protocol run which results in the construction
of the grouping proof. This proof is then verifiable by the trusted verifier in an offline
setting. The verifier hence, does not need to be involved directly during the execution
of the protocol.
Due to the “simultaneously scanned” requirement, the notion of time is very im-
portant, as already pointed out by Juels [11]. The correctness of this claim relies on
a timeout assumption. We assume that the reader measures the round-trip-time, i.e.
the time between sending a message to a tag and receiving the response, during the
execution of the protocol. If this round-trip-time exceeds a particular threshold, the
reader aborts and the protocol fails. Using a very tight threshold limits the power of
an adversary, but also increases the false rejection ratio. Besides the reader, also the
RFID tags are assumed to have a timeout mechanism. However, this timeout does
not need to be very precise and/or small (e.g., it can be in the order of seconds or
even larger). Due to this timeout assumption, the protocol will always terminate. The
accuracy of the grouping proofs with respect to timing, depends on the precision of
the timeouts.
We assume that the verifier is trusted by all devices in the system. Furthermore,
we assume that the public-key Y of the verifier is a system parameter, known by all
the devices that are involved in the construction of a grouping proof. Only the verifier
knows the corresponding private-key y. Knowledge of y is a necessary requirement to
check the correctness of a grouping proof. The result of a verification claim is failure
(if the grouping proof was not correct), or it gives the identities of the tags that were
scanned simultaneously. In this case the verifier stores the grouping proof and adds a
timestamp to it. This enables temporal ordering of the grouping proofs.
The task of the reader is to coordinate the execution of the protocol with the set of
tags (i.e., query the tags), collect the grouping proof and forward it to the verifier. The
reader does not have to check the correctness of the responses, and is not necessarily
trusted by the tags and/or the verifier.
Besides operational and computational requirements, both security and privacy
are important when employing the concept of grouping proofs in an RFID setting.
From a security point of view, the grouping proofs must be verifiable even if the
RFID tags were scanned by an adversarial reader or if the tags were compromised
by the adversary. Without loss of generality, let us now assume that there are only
two tags that are scanned simultaneously. To avoid an adversary impersonating tags
that were not present during the execution of the protocol and/or constructing fake
grouping proofs (i.e. that not reflect the correct situation), one needs to prevent the
following five potential attack scenarios:
Compromised tag: One of the tags involved in the protocol, is compromised by the
adversary. The reader is assumed to be non-compromised.
Man-in-the-middle attack: In this attack scenario, both tags are assumed to be non-
compromised, but the reader is compromised by the adversary.
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Colluding reader and tag: Both the reader and one of the tags are compromised by
the adversary, the other tag is assumed to be non-compromised.
Colluding tags: In this attack scenario, both tags are compromised by the adversary.
They can exchange some messages in advance (e.g., via another reader), but do
not know each other’s private key (e.g., it cannot be extracted from the tag). The
reader is assumed to be non-compromised.
Replay attack performed by eavesdropper: In this attack scenario, an eavesdrop-
ping outsider scans two non-compromised tags simultaneously. At a later time, it
replays the copied message-flow in the presence of a non-compromised reader to
impersonate the two tags, with none of these tags being actually present.
tag A tag B Reader Eavesdropper
Compromised tag X
Man-in-the-middle X
Colluding reader and tag X X
Colluding tags X X
Replay attack by eavesdropper X
Table 1 Five attack scenarios
The attack scenarios are summarized in table 1. For each of the scenarios, an X
denotes that the corresponding entity is compromised in that particular attack sce-
nario. Note that we do not consider the scenario where both tags and the reader are
compromised by the adversary, as this would allow compromised tags to construct a
valid grouping proof, even if they were not scanned simultaneously. We also do not
consider the attack where a compromised reader scans two non-compromised tags,
and forwards the grouping proof at a later time to the verifier (i.e. to have an incorrect
timestamp being added to the grouping proof). To avoid this, the verifier needs to
actively participate in the protocol, or one needs to incorporate the exact time in the
protocol in a verifiable way (e.g., use a challenge that depends on the time, in such
a way that the verifier can check this). Note that if only non-compromised readers
can communicate directly to the verifier, this attack is automatically prevented. Also
note that we only consider protocols on the logical level. Danev et al. [7] have shown
that one can also identify RFID tags based on their physical-layer fingerprints. This
is however outside the scope of this article.
In the design of our protocol, we also want to achieve untraceability, in which
the (in)equality of two tags must be impossible to determine. Only the trusted verifier
should be able to check which particular tags were scanned simultaneously. To evalu-
ate the privacy of RFID systems, several theoretical models have been proposed in the
literature [1,13,22,30]. We particularly focus on two characteristics of attackers from
the theoretical framework of Vaudenay [30]: wide (or narrow) attackers and strong
(or weak) attackers. If an attacker has access to the result of the verification of the
grouping proof (accept or reject) in the verifier, he is a wide attacker. Otherwise he is
a narrow attacker. If an attacker is able to extract a tag’s secret and reuse it to construct
a grouping proof, he is a strong attacker. Otherwise he is a weak attacker. Vaudenay
demonstrated that one needs to to employ public-key cryptography to achieve strong
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privacy requirements [30]. Because of this observation, we will rely on public-key
cryptography to construct a narrow-strong privacy-preserving grouping-proof proto-
col. For efficiency reasons, we will particularly use ECC.
Note that the grouping proofs that are proposed in this article, do not prove that the
tags are located in physical proximity to one another. An adversary can use multiple
readers, and forward messages between these devices, to simultaneously scan tags at
remote locations. Besides the large effort and cost, the effect of this attack is limited
due to the timeout mechanism. It can be completely prevented by employing RFID
distance bounding protocols (e.g., [4,9]). This is however outside the scope of this
article.
5 ECC-based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention
Starting from the ID-transfer protocol, which we briefly introduced in Sect. 3.2, we
can construct a privacy-preserving ECC-based grouping-proof protocol which pre-
vents all the five attack scenarios discussed in Sect. 4. The main idea is to intermingle
runs of the ID-transfer protocol with multiple tags into a single grouping-proof pro-
tocol, which we will denote as the CTP protocol (“colluding tag prevention”).
5.1 Protocol description
The two-party CTP protocol, which allows a pair of RFID tags (denoted by tag A and
B) to prove that they have been scanned simultaneously, is shown in Fig. 2. During
the entire execution of the protocol, the tags and/or the reader abort when a timeout
occurs, or when they receive the EC point at infinity. The protocol works as follows.
The reader first sends the messages “start left” and “start right” to indicate the role
of the tags in the protocol. Next, tag A generates a random number ra and the corre-
sponding EC point Ta,1. This message is then forwarded to tag B. Upon reception, B
will first generate a random number rb and compute the corresponding message Tb,1.
Next, it also computes the response Tb,2 using its private-key sb, the random number
rb, the x-coordinate of the challenge Ta,1, and a random challenge rs generated by the
reader. Both Tb,1 and Tb,2 are then transmitted to the reader. In the next stage of the
protocol, the reader forwards Tb,2 to tag A. This tag will then compute the response
Ta,2 using its private-key sa, the random number ra, and the x-coordinate of the chal-
lenge Tb,2. The result is forwarded to the reader. The grouping proof, collected by the
reader, consists of the following tuple:
(Ta,1,Ta,2,rs,Tb,1,Tb,2)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by tag A and B, the verifier first checks
that the proof was not used before (to detect replay attacks) and then performs the
following computations:
saP = (y−1Ta,2−Ta,1)x(Tb,2)−1
sbP = (y−1Tb,2−Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)−1
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Fig. 2 Two-party grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention (CTP).
sa,Y
Tag A Reader
sb,Y
Tag B
“start left”
ra ∈R Z
Ta,1 = raP
Ta,1
rs ∈R Z
“start right”, Ta,1, rs
rb ∈R Z
Tb,1 = rbP
Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y
Tb,1, Tb,2Tb,2
Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)sa)Y
Ta,2
If the public keys of A and B (Sa and Sb respectively) are registered in the database of
the verifier, the grouping proof is accepted and a timestamp is added.
5.2 Extension to n > 2 parties
The two-party CTP grouping-proof protocol shown in Fig. 2 can be easily extended
to multiple tags (n > 2). The output of each tag is then used as input for the “next” tag
in the chain, as shown in Fig. 3. This procedure is repeated until all tags are scanned.
The last tag in the chain (denoted by tag Z) sends Tz,2 to tag A, which then computes
its response Ta,2. The grouping proof consists of the following tuple:
(Ta,1,Ta,2,rs, . . . ,Ti,1,Ti,2, . . . ,Tz,1,Tz,2)
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Ta,1 Tb,2 T·,2
Tz,2
A B · · · Z
Ta,2
Fig. 3 Chain of grouping proofs.
To check the correctness of the grouping proof, the verifier performs similar opera-
tions as with the two-party CTP grouping-proof protocol.
As an example, let us illustrate this with a three-party grouping proof (constructed
by tags A, B and C). In this case, the response Tb,2 is sent to tag C. Upon reception, C
will generate a random number rc and perform the following two computations:
Tc,1 = rcP
Tc,2 = (rc + x(Tb,2)sc)Y
The output Tc,1 and Tc,2 is sent to the reader, which forwards it to tag A. The latter
can then compute the response Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tc,2)sa)Y . To check the correctness of
the grouping proof, the verifier needs to perform the following computations:
saP = (y−1Ta,2−Ta,1)(x(Tc,2))−1
sbP = (y−1Tb,2−Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)−1
scP = (y−1Tc,2−Tc,1)(x(Tb,2))−1
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Impersonation resistance
The two-party CTP grouping-proof protocol is constructed by entangling two in-
stances of the ID-transfer protocol [15]. Due to this construction, the CTP grouping-
proof protocol inherits the security properties of the ID-transfer protocol. The latter is
designed to provide secure entity authentication in the setting of an active adversary,
and can be shown to be equivalent to the Schnorr protocol [27] regarding imperson-
ation resistance. One can demonstrate that to impersonate a tag in either of our attack
scenarios, the adversary needs to know the private-key of that particular tag (or be
able to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [28]).
5.3.2 “Grouping” security
In the context of grouping proofs, it is not sufficient to have impersonation resistance.
It is also important to have assurance that all tags took part in the CTP grouping-proof
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protocol at some point in time. This is realized by the interconnection of the ID-
transfer protocol instances. All participating tags use an EC point that was generated
by another participating tag in their execution of the ID-transfer protocol. Each of
the responses computed by the tags hence depend on the output of another tag in the
chain. This entanglement proofs that all tags participated in the protocol.
The use of a timeout mechanism assures that all tags were scanned simultane-
ously, as the reader or a tag aborts the protocol if a timeout would occur.
Finally, the value rs is randomly generated by the reader for each protocol run it
initiates. The response Tb,2 will depend on this value, and cannot be computed in ad-
vance. Due to the interconnection of the ID-transfer protocol instances, the responses
of the other participating tags will depend on the response Tb,2, and consequently also
on the random value rs. This makes it impossible for a set of tags to run the protocol
“offline” (i.e., without the presence of the reader), recording all the generated values,
and at at later time using the generated values to mislead the reader into believing
that they are being scanned while in reality only one of them is present. Similarly,
this also prevents an eavesdropping outsider to scan a set of non-compromised tags,
and replay the flows at a later time to an authorized reader while non of the scanned
tags is present. As already discussed in this article, we do not consider the attack
where a reader forwards the grouping proof to the verifier with a large delay.
There is however one particular attack scenario where these mechanisms are not
sufficient. When closely observing fig. 2, one notices that tag A both starts and ends
the protocol. Because of this, tag A and the reader can collude to generate a valid proof
with any set of victim tags. In order to do this, tag A and the reader ignore the timeout
mechanism during the run of the protocol. The attack starts by tag A generating Ta,1
and giving this value to the reader. Next, at a later time, the protocol is carried out
with all the victim tags, but without tag A being present. Finally, again at some time
later, the reader finishes the protocol with tag A. To prevent this attack, one has to
extend the protocol by performing a second round of the protocol in reverse order,
using the final output of tag A (Ta,2) as initial input for first tag in the reverse loop.
Since this extension increases the computational complexity, we will not discuss it
further in the rest of this article. Note that this security problem does not occur when
tag B (or any of the other tags) and the reader collude.
5.3.3 Privacy analysis
The same argumentation as above can be used to demonstrate the privacy properties
of the CTP grouping-proof protocol. It was a specific design feature of our proto-
cols that only the trusted verifier can check the correctness of the grouping proofs,
and hence obtain any information on the tags that have been scanned simultaneously.
Since the ID-transfer protocol offers privacy protection against a narrow-strong ad-
versary, untraceability can even be guaranteed if the challenges of the ID-transfer
protocol are controlled by the adversary. The responses computed by the tags do
not leak any information about the tags’ identities to any third party that does not
know the private key y. As a direct consequence, one can demonstrate that our CTP
grouping-proof protocol inherits the privacy properties of the ID-transfer protocol,
and is hence also narrow-strong privacy-preserving.
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5.3.4 Cost analysis
The protocol uses the following operations: modular multiplication, addition, and
point multiplication on an elliptic curve, of which the latter is the most complex
operation and its use hence needs to be minimized.
In our protocol, each tag i has to perform two EC point multiplications to create
the output Ti,1 and Ti,2. The workload of a tag is independent of the number of tags n
involved in the protocol. Another interesting observation is that an n-party grouping
proof exactly contains 2n EC points. The bitlength of the grouping proof is thus
linearly dependent on the number of tags n. Note however that there is a practical
upper limit on the number of tags n that can be scanned simultaneously. If n is very
large, a timeout could occur in tag A before the protocol has terminated. This should
be taken into account when deploying the grouping-proof protocol.
6 Grouping-proof protocol without CTP
It is interesting to note that one can reduce the complexity of the CTP grouping-
proof protocol in scenarios where the last two attack scenarios described in Sect. 4
(colluding tags and replay attacks where an eavesdropper impersonates tags which it
has scanned before) are not relevant. In this case, one does need to check that the tags
are “online” during the run of the protocol and there is hence no longer a need for a
fresh random value rs. Instead of the reader generating the random challenge rs, one
can replace it by the value 1. Note that since this value is fixed, it should no longer be
sent to tag B. By performing this modification, the efficiency can be increased. The
resulting protocol still prevents the first three attack scenarios described in Sect. 4,
and all other security and privacy properties are similar to these of the CTP grouping-
proof protocol.
6.1 Protocol description
The reduced two-party grouping-proof protocol without CTP is shown in Fig. 4. It
works similar to the CTP grouping-proof protocol described in Sect. 5.1. The result
of the protocol is a grouping proof that consists of the following tuple:
(Ta,1,Ta,2,Tb,1,Tb,2)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by tag A and B, the verifier first checks if the
proof was not already sent before (this would indicate that a replay attack has taken
place). Next, it performs the following computations:
saP = (y−1Ta,2−Ta,1)(x(Tb,2))−1
sbP = (y−1Tb,2−Tb,1)(x(Ta,1))−1
If the public keys of A and B (Sa and Sb respectively) are registered in the database of
the verifier, the grouping proof is accepted and a timestamp is added.
The two-party grouping-proof protocol without CTP can be easily extended to
multiple tags (n > 2) by using the same principle as described in Sect. 5.2.
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Fig. 4 Two-party grouping-proof protocol without CTP.
sa,Y
Tag A Reader
sb,Y
Tag B
“start left”
ra ∈R Z
Ta,1 = raP
Ta,1 “start right”, Ta,1
rb ∈R Z
Tb,1 = rbP
Tb,2 = (rb + x(Ta,1)sb)Y
Tb,1, Tb,2Tb,2
Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)sa)Y
Ta,2
6.2 Analysis
6.2.1 Impersonation resistance
As discussed in Sect. 5.3, the CTP grouping-proof protocol is designed to provide se-
cure entity authentication in the setting of an active adversary, and is equivalent to the
Schnorr protocol [27] regarding impersonation resistance. These security properties
are independent of the choice of the value rs. By selecting the value 1, the CTP pro-
tocol can be transformed to the reduced grouping-proof protocol without CTP, and
consequently the latter hence also offers impersonation resistance.
6.2.2 “Grouping” security
It is rather trivial to see that the protocol shown in Fig. 4 does not offer resistance
to colluding tags, or to an eavesdropper that impersonates a set of tags which it has
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scanned before. By fixing the value rs to 1, all input needed to compute the tags’s re-
sponses depends on the tags’ data (i.e. random numbers, private keys, and challenges
generated by other tags), and not on any input from the reader. It is hence impossible
to determine if the grouping proof collected by a non-compromised reader is fresh
data, or is replayed from an earlier protocol flow.
The grouping-proof protocol without CTP still provides resistance to compro-
mised tags, compromised readers, or a colluding tag and reader. In each of these
attack scenarios, it is impossible to impersonate a non-compromised tag, since its
private key is needed to compute the response. The impersonation resistance com-
bined with the timeout mechanism hence guarantees the “grouping” security.
6.2.3 Privacy analysis
The privacy properties of the CTP protocol are independent of the choice of the value
rs. The grouping-proof protocol without CTP is hence also narrow-strong privacy-
preserving.
6.2.4 Cost analysis
By fixing the value rs to 1, tag B does not need to compute the EC point multiplication
rsTa,1. The number of EC point multiplications is reduced to 2 (compared to 3 in the
case of the CTP grouping-proof protocol. All other observations regarding the cost
of the protocol remain valid.
7 Implementation
In order to show the feasibility of the proposed protocols for RFID tags, we analyze
a hardware implementation of our solutions. The EC processor we present in this
article has a novel architecture that features the most compact and at the same time
the fastest solution when compared to previous work.
7.1 Overall architecture
The overall architecture is shown in Fig. 5. The processor is composed of a micro
controller, a bus manager and an EC processor (ECP). It is connected with a front-
end module, a random number generater (RNG), ROM and RAM as shown in the
overall architecture (Fig. 5). The solid arrows are for data exchange, the dash arrows
are for addressing, and control signals are omitted in this picture. The ROM stores
program codes and data. The program is executed by the micro controller and the
data may include a tag’s private key, the server’s public key and system parameters.
The program is basically a grouping proof for a tag or an authentication protocol. The
micro controller is able to perform general modular arithmetic operations (additions
and multiplications) in a byte-serial fashion. It also gives commands for the execution
of the ECP via the bus manager. The ECP loads a value k and an EC point P from
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Fig. 5 RFID Processor Architecture.
ROM or RAM and executes the EC scalar multiplication kP. After finishing the scalar
multiplication, it stores the results in RAM.
7.2 New design characteristics
The new ECP architecture is similar to the one presented in [17]. Further optimiza-
tions are performed in the register file and the Modular ALU (MALU). The EC pro-
cessor presented in [17] uses a MALU which performs modular addition and mul-
tiplications, and it reuses the logic of modular multiplications for modular squaring
operations. On the other hand, the new MALU we designed includes a specialized
squarer logic. Since the modular squaring can be completed in one cycle on a dedi-
cated squarer, the performance can be substantially increased with an overhead of the
square logic. Moreover, in the new architecture the size of register file is reduced to
5×163 bits from 6×163 bits as we are using ECC over GF(2163). This reduction is
possible since the specialized squarer requires only one operand as input. As a result,
the overall circuit area can be reduced even further after including the squarer in the
MALU while achieving a much higher performance.
Here we give more details on the new MALU architecture and elaborate on dif-
ferences with previous works. In this work, instead of designing and combining a
squarer with the MALU in a straightforward way, we merge the squarer with the
original MALU to minimize the hardware cost.
The squaring formula over the extended binary field of GF(2163), where the used
irreducible polynomial is r(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 +1, can be derived as follows:
A2 =
(
162
∑
i=0
aix
i
)2
= T1 +T2 +T3 (1)
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where
T1 =
81
∑
i=0
aix
2i +
80
∑
i=0
ai+82x
2i+1,
T2 =
77
∑
i=0
ai+82(x
2i+8 + x2i+7)+a160(x
6 + x4 + x3 + x+1)+a161(x5 + x2),
T3 =
79
∑
i=0
ai+82x
2i+4
+a160x
8 +a161(x
10 + x8 + x6 + x3)+a162(x
12 + x10 + x5 + x).
Note that T1 and T2 are whole 163-bit words and T3 has 89 terms, and that T1, T2 and
T3 can be derived by only wiring, without any logic operation. As we perform the
operation as A2 = (T2 +T3)+T1, the first addition requires an 89-bit XOR array and
the second addition requires a 163-bit XOR array.
Based on the derived equation, we can implement the squarer by implementing
two XOR arrays as shown in Fig. 7. Actually, we integrate two bold XOR arrays
shown in Fig. 6. As a result of integrating the squarer, a 163-bit XOR array and a
two-input 163-bit MUX are replaced with a three-input 163-bit MUX. In Table 2,
the new MALU is compared with the previous versions in terms of gate area, whose
measurements are performed by synthesizing with a UMC standard CMOS library.
The cost for the merged squarer is 558 gates.
Table 2 Comparison of MALUs of the digit size 1.
Operations Gate Area (d = 1) Comment
+, × 913 Gates No squarer
+, ×, ˆ2 1,636 Gates With a squarer not sharing XOR array
+, ×, ˆ2 1,471 Gates With a squarer sharing XOR array
Although in the proposed MALU, the word size and the irreducible polynomi-
als are fixed, this designing method can be applied to any arbitrary word size and
irreducible polynomial.
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The MALU operation can be described as the following Eq. (2).
A(x) = A2(x) mod P(x) if cmd = 2
A(x) = B(x) ·C(x) mod P(x) if cmd = 1, (2)
A(x) = A(x)+C(x) mod P(x) if cmd = 0,
where A(x) = Σaixi, B(x) = Σbixi, C(x) = Σcixi and P(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 +1.
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Fig. 8 MALU architecture with register file.
The architecture of MALU with the required registers is shown in Fig. 8. Here the
registers in the MALU are combined with the external registers to reduce the number
of registers. At the completion of each operation, only register RegA is updated while
registers RegB and RegC hold the same data as at the beginning of the operations (we
make the shift of d-bits of RegB a circular shift so the value goes back to the original
after finishing a multiplication). Therefore, RegB and RegC can be used not only to
store field operands but also to store some intermediate values.
7.3 Performance evaluation
The performance comparison is made with the work in [17] for the digit size of 4 in
the MALU for both architectures. This work achieves about 24% better performance
with a smaller circuit area, and the energy consumption is much smaller. In particu-
lar, the size of our ECP processor is estimated to 14,566 kgates. We used a 0.13µm
CMOS technology, and the gate area does not include RNG, ROM and RAM which
are required to store or run programmed protocols. The area specifies a complete
EC processor with required registers. The required number of cycles for scalar mul-
tiplication is 78544. Assuming an operating frequency of 700KHz expected power
consumption is around 11.33µW per point multiplication, which is a promising fig-
ure for the targeted applications. Table 3 gives the performance results for the two
proposed protocols.
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Moreover, this work includes the coordinate conversion to affine-coordinates from
Z-coordinates while the work of [17] gives output in Z-coordinates. This is very im-
portant as it was shown that representations with projective coordinates imply some
weaknesses with respect to side-channel security [21].
Table 3 Performance results of our protocols.
Protocols # PM/tag † Cycles Time(ms)
Grouping proof without CTP (Fig. 4) 2 157 088 224
Grouping proof with CTP (Fig. 2) 3 235 632 295
(† PM denotes the number of point multiplications.)
8 Conclusions
Various grouping-proof protocols have been proposed in the literature to enable mul-
tiple tags to generate a proof that they were scanned (virtually) simultaneously. The
common property for all the schemes proposed so far is the use of symmetric-key
primitives. However, this often results into scalability issues, and several security
and/or privacy problems. In this article, we have shown that the ID-transfer protocol
of Lee et al. can be extended to an efficient multi-party privacy-preserving grouping-
proof protocol for RFID that is based solely on ECC. The only complex operations
required from the tags are the generation of a random number and two EC point
multiplications. Next to this basic protocol we show how to extend the protocol to
multiple (n > 2) tags and how to reduce the complexity in the scenario when tags
cannot collude or when an adversarial reader cannot impersonate a set of tags it has
scanned before.
In addition, we presented a hardware architecture that can realize the proposed
grouping-proof protocols. The performance results show the feasibility of the proto-
cols even for a passive tag and outperforms other EC-based protocols proposed in the
literature.
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